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CONFLICT OF LAWS RELATING TO INSTALLMENT
SALES
Robert E. Lee*

T

HE most perplexing problem in the field of installment contracts
probably occurs when property sold by a title-retaining instrument
( conditional sale, chattel mortgage, or bailment lease) in one state is
removed to another state where rights of creditors of, or purchasers
from, the buyer attach.1 Inasmuch as the possession of the article has
been permitted to be in the buyer, so that outwardly, and with nothing
more, he is the apparent owner, the important question arises as to
whose rights are higher, the secret owner ( the conditional seller, the
chattel mortgagee, or the bailor) or the creditor of, or purchaser from,
the installment buyer? The answer depends, of course, upon which law
governs the validity and construction of the transaction between the
states involved, regard being given to the statutes, decisions, and public
policy of each.
Much of the confusion found in this phase of conflict of laws may be
attributed to the failure of many courts to recognize that the over-
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709 (1930); 13 MINN. L. REv. 724 (1929); 18 MINN. L. REv. 429 (1934); 6 Miss.
L. J. 416 (1934); 17 NEB. L. BuLL. 375 (1938); 17 N. C. L. REV. 56 (1938);
II N.Y. UNIV. L. Q.REV. 282 (1934); 74 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 749 (1926); 81 UNIV.
PA. L. REV. 767 (1933); IO TULANE L. REV. 275 (1936); 4 WASH. L. REV. 90
(1929); 37 YALE L. J. 966 (1928); 25 A. L. R. 115'3 (1923); 57 A. L .. R. 535,
702 (1928); 87 A. L. R. 1308 (1933); 112 A. L. R. 124 (1938).

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 41

whelming majority of these cases involve property problems to which
the lex loci rei sitae should be applied, and not contract problems to
which the lex loci contractus l>hould be administered. As Caldwell,
P. J., in Cable Co. v. McElhoe,2 an Indiana case, observed:
"· .• Any contract may present itself for construction in either
of two aspects, perhaps both. Thus, it may involve the personal
rights, duties and obligations of the parties to it, under its terms,
or it may relate to the title to or interest in property transferred
or reserved by it. Th~e distinctions are important in determining
questions of the conflict of laws."
If the controversy is between the original parties to the security transaction as to their rights and obligation~ to each other, the case is one of
property to be determined by the lex loci contractus.3 On the other
hand, if the controversy arises out of the asserted claim of third persons
such as creditors and innocent purchasers, it becomes necessary to invoke the lex loci rei sitae. In other words, title questions are governed
by the law of the place where the chattel was at the time the titleretaining instrument was executed; and contract questions are governed
by the law of the place where the contract was made.

I
THE COMMON LAW

A. General Application of Law of Situs
It is a modern rule that applies the law of the situs to the creation
and transfer of interests to movable chattels.4 Many of the earlier decisions applied the law of the domicile of the owner.5 Translating the
legal maxim, mobilia sequuntur personam, the courts said that movables follow the person of the owner. The rule was considered broad
enough to include title questions in voluntary transfers of chattels inter
58 Ind. App. 637 at 647, 108 N. E. 790 (1915).
The lex loci contractus is the law generally followed. It is the rule followed by
the Restatement. A few states adhere to the place of performance and the law intended
by the parties. The trend definitely is to apply lex loci contractus. 2 BEALE, CoNFLICT
OF J::Aws, § 332.57 (1935); GooDRicH, CoNFLICT OF LAws, .2d ed., § 107 (1938);
CONFLICTS RESTATEMENT, § 332 (1934).
4 GooDRICH, CoNFLICT oF LAws, 2d ed., § 149 (1938); 17 N. C. L. REv. 56
(1938). But the rule has become one generally accepted. 2 BEALE, CoNFLI'CT OF LAws,
§ 255 et seq. (1935); 14 C. J. S. 605 (1939); CoNFLICTS RESTATEMENT, § 255 et
seq. (1934); STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 357 (1937); 18 MINN. L. REV. 429
(1934).
5 GooDRicH, CoNFLICT oF LAws, 2d ed., § 149 (1938); STUMBERG, CoNFLICT
OF LAws 357 (1937); Carnahan, "Tangible Property and the Conflict of Laws," 2
UNiv. CHI. L. REv. 345 at 346 (1935).
2
3
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vivas as well as title questions in transfers of chattels upon death. The
domicile rule today, however, is usually limited to cases of succession
in the movables of an intestate. 6 It is recognized today that a person
does not carry around with him the personal property he owns. It
might.have been so in medieval times, but certainly not so today.7
The Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws,8 as well as leading text writers O on the subject, have adopted the lex situs as the correct rule to apply to property problems involving chattels. The Restatement provides that the capacity to convey a chattel,10 the formalities of the conveyance,11 the validity in substance of a conveyance,12 and
the nature of the interest created by a conveyance of a chattel 13 are all
determined by the law of the place where the chattel is situated at the
time of the conveyance. Thus, if the chattel should be located in a different state from that in which the conditional sale or chattel mortgage
is execute1, the law of the place where the chattel is located governs.14
6 CHEATHAM, DoWLING AND GooDRicH, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON CoNFLICT oF LAws 617 (1936), 2d ed., 759 (1941); DICEY, CONFLICT OF LAws,5th
ed., 799 (1932); GooDRicH, CONFLICT OF LAws, 2d ed., § 161 (1938); CONFLICTS
RESTATEMENT, § 303 (1934).
1 "The fiction that movables follow the person developed at a time when personal
property was not abundant, consisting chiefly of gold and jewels, which could be easily
transported by the owner from place to place. It was contrived for convenience and
intended to work out justice. In modern times, however, with the vast increase in
amount and variety of personal property, not immediately connected with the person
of the owner, the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam cannot always be carried to its
logical conclusion." 15 C. J. S. 927 (1939).
8 Sec. 255 et seq. (1934).
0 2 BEALE, CoNFLICT OF LAws, § 255 et seq. (1935); GooDRICH, CONFLICT OF
LAws, 2d ed.,§ 149 (1938); STUMBERG, CoNFLICT OF LAws 368-369 (1937).
10 Sec. 255 (1934). In Loftus v. Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat. Bank, 133 Pa. 97,
19 A. 347 (1890), where a married woman in England, who had no capacity to contract, gave a power of attorney to transfer bonds which were situated in Pennsylvania,
where she had capacity to contract, and the attorney executed the power in Pennsylvania, the court held a good title passed to the bonds.
11 Sec. 256.
12 Sec. 257.
18 Sec. 258.
14 Hervey v. Rhode Island Locomotive Works, 93 U.S. 664 (1876); Cronan v.
Fox, 50 N. J. L. 417, 14 A. II9 (1888); Hart v. Oliver·Farm Equipment Sales Co.,
37 N. M. 267, 21 P. (2d) 96 (1933); Boyer v. M. D. Knowlton Co., 85 Ohio St.
104, 97 N. E. 137 (19u); Green v. Van Buskirk, 5 Wall. (72 U. S.) 307 (1866),
7 Wall. (74 U. S.) 139 (1868); 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws, §§ 255.1, ·265.1,
272.2 (1935); GOODRICH, CoNFLICT OF LAws, 2d ed., §§ 153, 154 (1938); JoNEs,
CHATTEL MoRTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES, 6th ed., § 305 (1933); CoNFLICTS
RESTATEMENT, §§ 265, 266, 272, 273 (1934); 14 C. J. s. 606 (1939); 18 MINN.
L. REV. 429 (1934).
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Green v. Van Buskirk 15 is a leading case. Bates executed and delivered to Van Buskirk in New York a chattel mortgage on some safes
stored in Illinois. Two days later, before the mortgagee could record
the mortgage or take possession of the safes, they were attached in
Illinois by Green, a creditor of the mortgagor, and subsequently sold
in satisfaction of Bates' debt. The mortgagor, mortgagee, and creditor
were all domiciled in New York. By the law of New York, the mortgagee· had rights superior to creditors of the mortgagor; by the law of
Illip.ois, the creditor had rights superior to the mortgagee. In a subsequent litigation between the creditor and mortgagee, the New York
court held that the transaction should be governed by the law of New
York as this was the domicile of the owner. When the case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, that court held that
the transaction should be determined 'by the law of Illinois and that
the New York Court should give "full faith and credit" to the Illinois
attachment proceeding.

B. Removal Without Consent Under Chattel Mortgages and
Conditional Sales
The typical situation is where the chattel itself is removed, after
the execution of the chattel mortgage or conditional sale, into a di:fferent state by the chattel mortgagee or conditional buyer. If the chattel
mortgage or conditional sale is invalid in the state where the chattel is
situated at the time the agreement is executed, it will generally be held
invalid in any state into which the chattel is subsequently removed.16
But as to the law that should be applied when the chattel mortgage or
conditional sale is valid in the state where the chattel is situated at the
time the agreement is executed, and the chattel is subsequently removed into a state where the transaction is invalid, there is considerable
conflict of opinion. In many such cases the decision depends upon
whether or not the chattel is removed with the consent of the chattel
mortgagee or conditional seller. The view that a distinction should be
made between the case where the chattel is removed with consent of
5 Wall. (72 U.S.) 307 (1886), 7 Wall. (74 U. S.) 139 (1868).
2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§ 267.1 (chattel mortgages), 274.1 (conditional sales) (1935); CoNFLICTS RESTATEMENT, §§ 267 (chattel mortgages), 274
(conditional sales) (1934); l WILLISTON, SALES, 2d ed., 339 (1924); Beale has collected the case authorities. The rule is applicable, according to the Restatement,
although the circumstances are such that the instrument would have been valid had
the chattel been in the second state at the time the attempt was. made to mortgage or
conditionally sell it.
15

16
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the chattel mortgagee or conditional seller has been incorporated into
the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws.11
If a chattel mortgage or conditional sale is valid according to the
law of the state where the property is situated at the time the titleretaining instrument is executed, it will be sustained by the courts of
any state into which the property is subsequently removed without consent, even as against purchasers in good faith from, or creditors of, the
chattel mortgagor or conditional buyer,18 at least, in the absence of a
settled public policy or positive statute in the state to which the property has been removed. Under the foregoing rule the title-owner's
rights are protected in the state into which the property has been removed, regardless of the fact that the contract has not been recorded
under the laws of the second state.10 It is usually held that recording
statutes are applicable only to chattel mortgages and conditional sales
made within the state upon property therein situated, and as having
no reference to property brought into the state which is at the time
17

Sec. 268 et seq. ( l 934).
Mercantile Acceptance Corp. v. Frank, 203 Cal. 483, 265 P. 190 (1928)
(chattel mortgage); Mosko v. Matthews, 87 Colo. 5 5, 284 P. 102 l ( l 930) (chattel
mortgage); Starr v. Govatos, 3 W.W. Harr. (33 Del.) 66,130 A. 392 (1925) (conditional sale); Fry Bros. v. Theobold, 205 Ky. 146, 265 S. W. 498 (1924) (conditional sale); Shelton's Garage v. Walston, 212 Ky. 602, 279 S. W. 959 (1926) (conditional sale); Goetschius v. Brightman, 245 N. Y. 186, 156 N. E.- 660 (1927),
affirming 214 App Div. 158, 211 N. Y. S. 763 (1925) (conditional sale); Rodecker
v. Jannah, 125 Wash. 137, 215 P. 364 (1923) (conditional sale); Ashland Finance
Company v. Dudley, 98 W. Va. 255, 127 S. E. 33 (1925) (chattel mortgage); 2
BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§ 268.1 (chattel mortgage), 275.1 (conditional sale)
(1935); BERRY, AUTOMOBILES, 7th ed., § 6.361 (1935); GooDRICH, CoNFLICT OF
LA".{S, 2d ed., §§ 153-154 (1938); CoNFLICTS RESTATEMENT, §§ 268 (chattel
mortgage), 275 (conditional sale) (1934); STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAws, 366
(1937); VoLD, SALES,§ 100 (1931); I WILLISTON, SALES, 2d ed.,§ 339 (1924);
IO AM. JuR. 729 (1937); Carnahan, "Tangible Property and the Conflict of Laws,"
2 UNiv. Cm. L. REv. 345 at 364-376 (1935); 6 Miss. L. J. 416 (1934); 41
HARV. L. REV. 779 (1928); 17 N. C. L. REv. 56 at 58 (1938); 74 UNIV. PA. L.
REV. 749 (1926); 81 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 767 (1933); 87 A. L. R. 1308 (1933).
In Goetschius v. Brightman, 245 N. Y. 186, 156 N. E. 660 (1927), affirming
214 App. Div. 158, 2II N. Y. S. 763 (1925), property conditionally sold in California, where no recordation was required, was subsequently removed without the
seller's consent to New York, where filing of the conditional sale contract was required.
Afterwards the property was sold by the conditional buyer in New York to a bona fide
purchaser. Held, that the law of California should govern and the conditional seller
might recover the property.
19
Shapard v. Hynes, (C. C. A. 8th, 1900) 104 F. 449; Mercantile Acceptance
Co. v. Frank, 203 Cal. 483, 265 P. 190 (1928); CoNFLICTS RESTATEMENT, § 268,
comment c (1934).
18

45o

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 41

already encumbered with a valid lien created elsewhere. 20 This is not
true, of course, where the statute expressly states that it is to apply to
foreign-executed chattel mortgages and conditional sales. But the
statute must by clear and explicit terms state that foreign-executed
chattel mortgages and conditional sales are within its scope.
Mercantile Acceptance Co. v. Frank 21 illustrates the rule. An
automobile was brought into Minnesota under a chattel mortgage contract, which was executed and recorded in accordance with the laws of
Minnesota. Subsequently, without the knowledge or consent of the
mortgagee, the automobi_le was driven to California and sold by the
mortgagor to an innocent purchaser. The mortgage was not transcrib"ed
in accordance with the chattel mortgage registration laws of California.
The court held that the mortgagee should recover the automobile.
Principles of fairness and commercial expediency seem to be behind
the rule that protects the interest of the absentee owner whose property
has been brought into a state without his consent.22 Stumberg has said:
"· .. A majority of the courts feel that preference should be
given the conditional vendor or mortgagee when the chattel is
wrongfully removed from the state where it was originally sold
and the law there has been complied with, because they think that
it is better social policy to protect him against a person, who,
although he is innocent, is claiming title through a wrongdoer
whose wrongful act is beyond the effective control of the vendor
or mortgagee." 23
The policy of protecting the security of credit transactions outweighs
the policy of protecting innocent purchasers and creditors.24
20 Shapard v. Hynes, (C. C. A. 8th, 1900) 104 F. 449; Mercantile Acceptance
Co. v. Frank, 203 Cal. 483, 265 P. 190 (1928); GooDRICH, CoNFLICT OF LAws, 2d
ed., § 153 (1938); 1 JoNES, CHATTEL MoRTGAGEs AND CoNDITIONAL SALES, 6th ed.,
§ 303 (1933); Carnahan, "Tangible Property and the Conflict of Laws," 2 UNiv.
Cm. L. REv. 345 at 377 (1935).
21 203 Cal. 483, 265 P. 190 (1928).
22 Mercantile Acceptance Co. v. Frank, 203 Cal. 483, 265 P. 190 (1928); I
BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 50.2, 3 id., § 268.1 (1935); GOODRICH, CONFLICT
OF LAws, 2d ed., § 152 (1938); STOMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 366 (1937).
23 STOMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 366 (1937).
.
24 ln Mercantile Acceptance Co. v. Frank, 203 Cal. 483 at 491, 265 P. 190
(1928), the court said, "Their [the purchasers'] loss in our opinion would be but
slight compared with that which might ensue to that larger body of our citizens who
in good faith have invested their ,capital in chattel mortgages upon various kinds of
passage the Colorado court in Mosko v. Matthews, 87 Colo. 55 at 62, 284 P. 1021
personal property, and particularly upon motor vehicles." And after quoting this
(1930), added "This statement is the more appropriate in view of the fact that the
automobile industry is one of the largest in the world, and the opportunities for fraud
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The basis of the rule is frequently stated to be the doctrine of
comity.25 Goodrich says:
"In the dictionary definition, comity means 'courtesy between
equals; friendly civility.' Such a conception of the matter supposes
one sovereign state stepping back, and, as a matter of courtesy,
allowing the law of another to operate within the territory of the
first. Each recognition of the foreign law or rights acquired under
it would then involve a temporary abrogation of sovereign power
on the part of the state affording the recognition." 26
Accordingly, the theory that the law of one state should be recognized
in another on the ground of "comity" does not carry the sanction of the
Restatement or of writers in the field of conflict of laws.27 It is said that
the laws of a state are not given an extraterritorial effect in the courts
of another on principles of courtesy, but because the doctrine of applying the law of the foreign state in the particular state is a part of the
common law of that state. The rules of conflict of laws are a part of
the law of the state that applies them. Under this view there is no extension of foreign law into another sovereign's territory.
Beale 28 approaches the problem of removal without consent from
the jurisdictional aspect, thus:
"Such little authority as there is, therefore, is to the effect that
a state has no jurisdiction over the title of an absent owner in a
second to none. Without the assistance of legitimate mortgages undoubtedly millions
who now ride would be compelled to walk, or be relegated to more primitive means
of travel, and the well recognized business of taking mortgages should not be lightly
impaired or destroyed."
25 Hervey v. Rhode Island Locomotive Works, 93 U. S. 664 (1876); Shapard
v. Hynes, (C. C. A. 8th, 1900) 104 F. 449; Mercantile Acceptance Co. v. Frank,
203 Cal. 483, 265 P. 190 (1928); I JONES, CHA'ITEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL
SALES, 6th ed., § 299 (1933); Carnahan, "Tangible Property and the Conflict of
Laws," 2 UNIV. CHI •. L. REV. 345 at 365 (1935); 17 N. C. L. REv. 56 at 61
(1938).
26 GooDRICH, CoNFLICT OF LAws, 2d ed., § 5 (1938).
27 CoNFLICTS RESTATEMENT, § 6 (1934); GooDRICH, CONFLICT oF LAws, 2d
ed., § 5 (1938); DICEY, CONFLICT OF LAws, 5th ed., 10-11 (1932); Cook, "The
Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws," 33 YALE L. J. 457 (1924).
28 I BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws, § 50.3 (1935); also appearing in Beale, "Jurisdiction Over Title of Absent Owner," 40 HARV. L. REV. 805 at 811 (1927).
Beale's view was expressed in a tentative draft of the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, as follows: "If a chattel belonging to a person who is not a citizen of or
domiciled in the state, is brought into the state without his consent, the state has no
jurisdiction over his title to the chattel until he has had a reasonable opportunity to
remove it or until the period of prescription in the state has run." (Italics added.)
CONFLICTS RESTATEMENT, (Tentative.Draft No. 2), § 52 (1926).
·
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chattel which has been brought into the state without any act of his
sufficient to submit his interest in the chattel to the jurisdiction of
the state. . .. Ownership is a legalized relation between a person
and a thing. . . : Jurisdiction over the thing does not necessarily
involve jurisdiction over the person or over his interest in the
thing."
Goodrich 29 also seems to share this view.

C. Removal With Consent Under Chattel Mortgages
and Conditional Sales
In a few of the states the security interests of the c;hattel mortgagee
and conditional seller will be protected even though the property is
removed into another state with the knowledge and consent of the lien
claimant.80 No distinction is, therefore, made between consent and lack
of consent to removal. The reasons given are usually the same ones
that are stated when the removal is made without the consent of the
chattel mortgagee or conditional seller. It is frequently said that the
rights of the lien claimant arise from the security contract itself and not
from any care in keeping track of the property; and that rights acquired under the law of one state ought not to be divested by the
removal of the property with permission into another state.31 This is
the view that Goodrich champions.82
The great weight of authority, now embodied in the Restatement,
29 "It may be that, where property is brought into a state without the consent of
the owner, such state does not have jurisdiction to control title to the property."
GooDRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws, 2d ed., § 152 (1938).
80 Davis v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 35 Ariz. 392, 278 P. 384 (1929); First
National Bank of Ellsworth v. Ripley, 204 Iowa 590, 215 N. W. 647 (1927); Handley v. Harris, 48 Kan. 606, 29 P. 1145 (1892); Gross v. Jordan, 83 Me. 380, 22 A.
250 (1891); Wilson & Co. v. Carson, 12 Md. 54 (1857); Silver v. McDonald, 172
Minn. 458, 215 N. W. 844 (1927); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
Northwest Engineering Co., 146 Miss. 476, 112 So. 580 (1927); Greenville Nat.
Bank v. Evans-Snyder-Buel Co., 9 Okla. 353, 60 P. 249 (1900); 14 C. J. S. 607
(1939); 17 N. C. L. REV. 56 (1938). In Shapard v. Hynes, (C. C. A. 8th, 1900)
104 F. 449, a leading case, the property mortgaged was in Texas and the m<:>rtgage
was there recorded. Subsequently the property was removed to Indian Territory and
there levied upon by a creditor. The mortgage was not recorded in _accordance with
the recording statutes of the Indian Territory. It was held that the mortgagee's interest
was to be protected whether the property was removed with or without consent. The
court pointed out that recording statutes are usually considered applicable only to
mortgages made within that st:tte upon property there situated and have no reference
to property brought into the state under a valid lien created elsewhere.
81 17 N. C. L. REv. 56 at 59 (1938).
82 GooDRICH, CoNFLICT OF LAws, 2d ed., §§ 153-154 (1938).
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is to the e:ffect that a conditional seller's or chattel mortgagor's security
interest will be forfeited if th~ property is removed into another state
with his knowledge or consent, unless he takes steps to comply with the
statutes of the state into which the property is removed. 88 It is said that
by expressly or impliedly assenting to removal, the chattel mortgagee
or conditional seller has waived his lien against every person except the
chattel mortgagor and conditional buyer.34 In a sense he has acquiesced
to the jurisdiction of the state into which the property has been taken;
for whoever sends, or consents to the removal of, property to another
state impliedly submits to the regulations of that state concerning its·
transfer. 85 A negligent failure to comply with the law of the state into
which the property has been removed, after knowledge of removal has
been acquired, is tantamount to placing in the hands of the chattel
mortgagor or conditional buyer a power to deceive and defraud innocent persons. A balancing of the equities between the title claimant and
innocent persons, under such circumstances, justifies the preference
accorded innocent purchasers from, and creditors of, the person in
possession.

II
EFFECT OF RECORDING STATUTES

A. Effect of Ordinary Chattel Mortgage and Conditional
Sale Recording Statutes
As previously noted,86 the ordinary chattel mortgage or conditional
sale recording statute is generally construed to apply only to titleretaining instruments executed upon property located within the state
and does not embrace foreign-executed security transactions, unless the
state by clear and explicit terms of a legislative enactment has brought
foreign-executed security transactions, on property removed to the
state, within the scope of the recording statute. "Every state has jurisdiction over all property, personal and real, within its territorial limits,
and, within the bounds of legislation, may regulate and control it in
88

CoNPLICTS RisTATEMENT, §§ 270 (chattel mortgages), 278 (conditional sale)
(1934); 4 WASH. L. REV. 90 (1929); Hervey v. Rhode Island Locomotive Works,
93 U. S. 664 (1876); Wilson & Co. v. Carson, 12 Md. 54 (1857); Corbett v.
Littlefield, 84 Mich. 30, 47 N. W. 581 (1890); Eli Bridge Co. v. Lachman, 124
Ore. 592, 265 P. 435 (1928); see Goetschius v. Brightman, 245 N. Y. 186 at 191192, 156 N. E. 660 (1927).
84
2 BEALE, CONFLICT OP LAWS, § 209.1 ( l 93 5).
85
Hervey v. Rhode Island Locomotive Works, 93 U. S. 664 (1876); see
Goetschius v. Brightman, 245 N. Y. 186 at 191-192, 156 N. E. 660 (1927).
86
See note 20, supra.
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such manner as to it may seem fit or expedient." 87 A growing number of
states have enacted statutes that apply specifically to property brought
within the state upon a foreign-executed chattel mortgage or conditional sale. In accordance with the Restatement of the Conflict of
Laws,88 these statutes are applicable only when the property is brought
into the state with the consent of the chattel mortgagee or conditional
seller. However, in a few states, the recordi~g statutes are held definitely to be applicable to cases where the removal into the jurisdiction is
without consent,89 and one writer has contended 'fthat such disposition
is within the power of the forum and its exercise, whether authorized
legislatively or under common law application, constitutes no violation
of the due process clause of the Constitution." 40

B. Provisions of Uniform Conditional' Sales Act and
Uniform Chattel Mortgage Act
Section r4 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, enacted in Alaska
and nine states,41 provides that when property is removed by the conditional buyer from one county within a state to another, or removed
from another state into a county of a different state., and the conditional
sale contract or copy thereof h:is not been filed in the county to which
the property has been removed, within ten days after the conditional
seller has received notice of the county to which the property has been
removed, the conditional seller's rights are not protected against the
claims of purchasers and creditors without notice of the conditional
buyer.42 An Arizona court, inconstruing the particular provision, said:
Smead v. Chandler, 71 Ark. 505 at 510, 76 S. W. 1066 (1903).
Secs. 270, 278 (1934).
89 3 JoNES, CHATTEL MoRTGAGES AND CoNDITIONAL SALEs, 6th ed., § u6o_
(1933).
4 ° Carnahan, "Tangible Property and the Conflict of Laws," 2 UNiv. CHI. L.
REv. 345 at 378 (1935), collecting and arranging cases by states.
41 Arizona, Delaware, Indiana, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, South
Dakota, West Virginia and Wisconsin. 2 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED (Supp.
1941), p.6.
42 The filing in the county into which the property has been removed is a constructive notice for three years, just as the filing in the county where the property
was originally first kept by the buyer was a constructive notice for three years. BoGERT,
CoMMENTARIEs oN CoNDITIONAL SALES, 2A UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED, § 97
(1924); Uniform Conditional Sales Act, §§ 14, l I. The filing may, however, be
extended for successive periods of one year each by refiling within thirty days preceding the expiration of each period. Uniform Conditional Sales Act, § II.
In Osgood Co. v. Emblem Oil Co., II l Pa. Super. 38, l 68 A. 5 l 5 ( l 93 3),
it was held that for a conditional sale contract to be valid, where goods sold under
it are moved from one filing district to another after the three-year period following
37
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"The validity of a conditional contract of sale made in another
state is recognized; the only requirement being that it be filed by
the seller in the county in this state to which the goods have been
removed, within ten days after he has received notice of the removal. . . . The time for filing runs, not from the removal, but
from the seller's notice of the place to which property has been
removed." 48

If the conditional seller files the contract more than ten days after
he has received notice of the county to which the goods have been
removed, the filing becomes valid from the date of filing. 44
An illustration of the operation of this section of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act may be found in a New Jersey case, Thayer Mercantile Co. v. First National Bank of Milltown. 45 An automobile was sold
in New York under a conditional sale contract filed in accordance with
the laws of New York. The automobile was subsequently removed to
New Jersey without the knowledge of the seller and contrary to the
terms of the contract, where it was attached by a resident creditor as
the property of the buyer. It was not filed in accordance with the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, which was in force in New Jersey. Accordingly, the creditor was preferred over the buyer who, having had
the original filing, it is necessary either (1) that the exemplification filed show upon
its face that the period has been properly extended in a former filing district or ( 2)
that the copy of the contract have attached to it the statement of the seller.
Section 14 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act expressly exempts railroad
equipment and rolling stock from the requirement of refiling on removal.
The "purchasers and creditors" referred to in the Uniform Conditional Sales
Act are those who purchase or acquire a lien on the property prior to the filing and
without notice that the buyer held the goods under a conditional sale contract. 2
UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED, § 5 (1922). In Pennsylvania the lien of a creditoi; is
acquired when the writ of fieri f(Z(:ias is placed in the hands of the sheriff, 'and not as
of the time when actual levy on the personal property is made. Wilson, Sieger & Co.'s
Appeal, 13 Pa. 429 (1850); Braden's Estate, 165 Pa. 184, 30 A. 746 (1895);
Spicks v. Prospect Brewing Co., 19 Pa. Super. 399 (1902); Williams Patent Crusher
& Pulverizer Co. v. Reily, p8 Pa. Super. 64, 180 A. 156 (1935). Therefore, a
receipt of notice of a conditional sale contract prior to actual levy but subsequent to the
placing of the writ into the hands of the sheriff is ineffective. Williams Patent Crusher
and Pulverizer Co. v. Reily, supra. It seems that this view is contrary to the decisions
in the other states that have adopted the Uniform Conditional Sales Act. In these
states the creditor must be without notice at the time the actual levy is made. See a.
criticism of the Patent Crusher case in 2 UNiv. Prrrs. L. REV. 67 (1935).
48
Bradshaw v. Kleiber Truck Co., 29 Ariz. 293 at 297-298, 241 P. 305 (1925).
44
BOGERT, COMMENTARIES ON CONDITIONAL SALES, 2A UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED§ 97 (1924):
45

98 N.

J.

L. 29, II9 A. 94 (1922).
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knowledge of the removal, had failed to file within ten days. Some of
the opinion is worth stating here:

a

". . . As general rule, a transfer of property valid where
made is effectual everywhere; but a universally recognized exception to this rule is that, where it is opposed to some statutory
policy of the state of the rei sitae, where it is sought to be enforced, the statute is paramount, and the rule is nullified thereby.
. . . And so where a state, in the exerdse of its sovereign power,
regulates by positive law the disposition of personal property
found within its borders, and prefers its own attaching creditors
to a foreign assignee of a chattel, or the conditional vendor
thereof, the statutory right conferred upon the resident creditor
overrides the rights of such assignee or conditional vendor vested
in him by the law of the forum of the state where the contract
was made." 46
The Uniform Chattel Mortgage Act, which, although approved
by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1926 47
has been enacted in only one state,48 is substantially the same as the
Uniform Conditional Sales Act in regard to the removal of chattels.
The mortgage is given a ret.roactive validity at the new situs if filed by
the mortgagee within ten days after receiving notice, but if the mortgage is filed later than six months after removal, the mortgagee's interest may be defeated by innocent purchasers from, or creditors of, the
mortgagor, "although the mortgagee neither consented to the removal
or had notice of the destination." 49
The Uniform Conditional Sales Act and the Uniform Chattel
Mortgage Act provide as satisfactory solutions to the whole problem
of removal ·of chattels under title-retaining instruments as can be
found. The equities of the title claimant and innocent third persons
have been f~irly considered. 50 Neither act accords to third persons deal-

J. L. at 32.
1926 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM LAws AND PROCEEDINGS 419 et seq.
48 Indiana, 1941 id. 335.
49 1926 id. 440, § 44.
50 Section 13 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act requires the conditional buyer
to give the conditional seller, personally or by registered mail, written notice not less
than ten days before the removal of the property from the filing district, specifying
the place to which the property is to be removed and the approximate time of such
intended removal. Failure to give the notice constitutes a violation of the contract
and the the seller may retake the goods and deal with them the same as if there had been
a default in payment. The duty of the conditional buyer to notify the conditional seller
of any change in the location of the goods balances the duty of the conditional seller
46

47

Id. '98 N.
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ing with the party in possession any rights that will operate to the
detriment of an innocent and alert title claimant outside of the state in
which the goods are located. In his Com,mentaries,6 1 the draftsman of
the Uniform Conditional Sales Act says:
". . . The seller need not· complain under the act that any
unreasonable burden is placed upon him by these refiling provisions. He is required to take no action till he knows the goods
have been removed. The expense and labor of a second filing is
slight. The seller is given a privilege of being allowed to use this
deceptive credit device. He should pay for the privilege by undergoing some slight expense and trouble in following the goods
with a public record."
The acts do not conflict with the rules of the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws.

III
SPECIAL PROBLEMS

A. Colorado, Texas, and Pennsylvania Doctrines
Contrary to all the above discussed rules is the rare doctrine of
three states that refuses to recognize under any conditions, as against
innocent third persons, foreign-executed chattel mortgages or conditional sales on property brought into the state. This unusual doctrine
applies notwithstanding the fact that the property is brought within
the state without the consent of the chattel mortgagee or conditional
seller and there is no positive statute in the forum requiring recordation of foreign-executed chattel mortgages or conditional sales. The
rule is applied to chattel mortgages in Colorado 52 and in Pennsylto file the contract in the filing district to which the property has been removed. "If
both duties are performed, the seller will have protection to which he is entitled, and
the general public will be given notice which will protect it from reliance on deceptive
appearance of ownership." BoGERT, CoMMENTARIES ON CoNDITIONAL SALES, 2A
UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED, § 91, p. 129 (1924).
Section 15 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act affords the conditional seller
and general public further protection by imposing a criminal penalty upon any condi, tional buyer who "maliciously or with intent to defraud, shall injure, destroy or
conceal the goods, or remove them to a filing district where the contract or copy
thereof is not filed, without having given the notice required by Section 13."
Sections 40 and 42 of the Uniform Chattel Mortgage Act has analogous provisions for the protection of the chattel mortgagee and innocent third persons dealing
with the person in possession.
51 BocERT, COMMENTARIES ON CoNDITIONAL SALES, 2A UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED, § 97 (1924).
52 Turnbull v. Cole, 70 Colo. 364, 201 P. 887 (1921); Commercial Credit Co.
v. Higbie, 92 Colo. 346, 20 P. (2d) 543 (1933); American Equitable Assurance Co.
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vania 53 and to both chattel mortgages and conditional sales-in Texas. 54
In all three states the rule is based upon principles of public policy.
In Texas chattel mortgages and conditional sales are recognized if
v. Hall Cadillac Co., 93 Colo. 186, 24 P. (2d) 980 (1933); 6 RocKY MT. L. ·REv.
221 (1934).
In Turnbull v. Cole, supra, an automobile, sold in Utah under a conditional
sale contract, was remove\! into Colorado without the knowledge of the conditional
seller. It was ·sold to another, by whom it was then mortgaged. The assignee of the
conditional seller took possession and the mortgagee replevied. In holding the mortgagee entitled to the car, the court said, 70 Colo. at 365-366: "Defendant in error
concedes that a conditional sale does not pass title, according to the decisions of the
courts of Utah. That being so, plaintiff in error contends that, under the rule of
comity between states, the courts of this state should give effect to the contract, notwithstanding the fact that in this state such contracts are held to be absolute sales, as
against creditors, and purchasers without notice of the ~endor's claim of title .•.. It
is settled in this jurisdiction that contracts like that here under consideration, reserving a secret lien to the vendor, will not be recognized as leaving title in the vendor,
as against interested parties without notice [ citing Colorado cases in support]. In
Coors v. Reagen [44 Colo. 126, 96 P. 966 (1908)] this court quoted with approval
from Weber v. Diebold Safe etc. Co. [2 Colo. App. 68, 29 P. 747 (1892)] a statement that 'transactions of this character are not favored and are opposed to public
policy.' We are, therefore, of the opinion that the trial court was right in holding
that the contract, though valid in Utah, could nqt be enforced in this state, because
such action would be contrary to public ·policy, and would result in detriment to the
interests of a citizen of this state."
.
·
Chattel mortgages are provided for by statute in Colorado. Colo. Stat. Anri.
(1935), c. 32.
'
Colorado recognizes foreign-executed chattel mortgages on property that is
brought within the state without the consent of the mortgagee. Mosko v. Matthews, ·
87 Colo. 55, 287 P. 1021 (1930).
,
53
The public policy of Pennsylvania is so strongly against chattel mortgages that
a chattel mortgage validly executed and recorded out this state, in a jurisdiction where
such instruments are recognized and given full effect, will not avail against the claims
of bona fide purchasers from, or creditors of, the mortgagor in this state. Buffalo Coal
Co. v. Rochester & State Line Ry., 8 W. N. C. 126 (Pa. 1880); Sherman State Bank
v. Carr, 15 Pa. Super. 346 (1900); Commonwealth v. One Studebaker Light Six
Coupe, 86 Pa. Super. 532 (1926); Commercial Banking Corp. v. Berkowitz, 104 Pa.
Super. 523, 159 A. 214 (1931); Kauffman and Baer v. Monroe Motor Line Transportation, 124 Pa. Super. 27, 187 A. 296 (1936); Armitage v. Spahn, 4 Pa. Dist.
270 (1891); Commonwealth v. Cutshall, 4 Pa. D. & C. 683 (1923). This is true
even though the property has been removed to Pen~sylvania without the consent or
knowledge of the mortgagee. Commercial Banking Corp. v. Berkowitz, supra.
5
"' Willys-Overland Co. v. Chapman, (Tex. Civ. App. 1918) 206 S. W. 978
( unrecorded lease agreement executed in California, where leases and conditional sales
were not required to be recorded); Consolidated Garage Co. v. Chambers, I I I Tex.
293, 231 S. W. 1072 (1921), affirming Chambers v. Consolidated Garage Co., (Tex.
Civ. App. 1919) 210 S. W. 565 (unrecorded eonditional sale executed in California,
where conditional sales were not required to be recorded); Farmer" v. Evans, I 11 Tex.
283, 233 S. W. IOI (1921) (chattel mortgage filed and recorded in accordance with
Oklahoma statutes); General Motors Acceptance Corp., (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) 36
S. W: (2d) 589 (recorded conditional sale executed in Pennsylvania where the Uni-
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executed within the state,55 but not if they are executed outside the
aforesaid state on property that is afterwards brought within the state.56
In Pennsylvania the public policy against chattel mortgages is so
strong 57 that neither domestic nor foreign-executed chattel mortgages
form Conditional Sales Act is in force). In ali°the Texas cases the chattels were removeii
into Texas without the knowledge and consent of the title claimant.
The Texas cases have been severely criticized. 1 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws,
§ 50.3 (1935).
,
In Consolidated Garage Co. v. Chambers, supra, the plaintiff sold an automobile
to Nickols under an unrecorded conditional sale contract, which stipulated that the car
should not be removed from California. Conditional sales were not required to be recorded in California. Subsequently Nickols, without the consent or knowledge of the
plaintiff, took the car to Texas and sold it to the defendant, who was without notice
of any defect in Nickols' title. In determining the ownership of the car in the defendant's favor, the Supreme Court of Texas said, 11 1 Tex. at 298: "Plaintiff in error
insists that it is a hard rule to deprive him of his reservation of title or lien upon the
property without any negligence on his part. Also it is a hard rule to deprive an
innocent purchaser for value of the property when he has been at no fault. The difference between them is this: While it works a hardship upon the mortgagee, yet he
trusts the property to the possession of the mortgagor, and thereby puts it within the
power of the mortgagor to dispose of the property to one who has no notice of his
claim." The court asserted that the policy of the state was expressed in the statutes.
The statutes are, in truth, the ordinary chattel mortgage recording statutes. No mention is made of foreign-executed chattel mortgages or c6nditional sales. The Texas
courts have simply interpreted the statutes as applying to foreign-executed chattel
mortgages and conditional sales.
If the recording statutes are construed as applying to foreign-executed titleretaining instruments, then it seems that such instruments can be validated in Texas
by complying with the Texas statutes. Willys-Overland ·Co. v. Chapman, supra, 206
S. W. at 980, says: "The Legislature made no exception in favor of foreign conditional
contracts or chattel mortgages executed and effective in other states, where the property
embraced in such instrument is subsequently brought into this state and here sold, in
enacting articles 5654 and 5655, Vernon's Sayles' Civil Statutes."
Bailment leases and conditional sales are by statute designated chattel mortgages
in Texas. Tex. Stat. (Vernon, 1936), art. 5489.
55
Tex. Stat. (Vernon, 1936), art 5489 et seq.; 1 JoNES, CHATTEL MoRTGAGES
AND CONDITIONAL SALES, 6th ed., § 229 (1933).
36
See note 54, supra.
57
In Pennsylvania, chattel mortgages, except in connection with specially enumerated classes of personal property, are construed as fraudulent and unenforceable as
to innocent third persons dealing with the mortgagor in possession. Clow v. Woods,
5 Serg. & R. 275 (Pa. 1819); Welsh v. Bekey, I Pen. & W. 57 (Pa. 1829); Roberts'
and Pynes' Appeal, 60 Pa. 400 (1869); Klaus v. Majestic Apartment House Co., 250
Pa. 194, 95 A. 451 (1915); Barlow v. Fox, 203 Pa. 114, 52 A. 57 (1902); Commonwealth v. One Studebaker Light Six Coupe, 86 Pa. Super. 532 (1926); Kauffman
& Baer v. Monroe Motor Line Transportation, 124 Pa. Super. 27, 187 A. 296
(1936); Baker's Executors v. Consumers' Box Board & Paper Co., 21 Pa. Dist. 113
(1911); see Boyle v. Rankin, 22 Pa. 168 at 171 (1853); Cole v. Nonemaker, 78 Pa.
501 at 504 (1875).
In 1932 the United States Circuit Court of Appeals was heard to say: "The
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will be recognized upon property located within the state. 58 Colorado
refuses to recognize, for the same reason, both domestic 59 and foreignexecuted 00 conditional sales on property located within the state.
Although Louisiana does not recognize conditional sales executed
within the state,61 it now finds nothing violative of the state's public
policy to give e:lfect to conditional sales executed in other states on
property afterwards brought within the state.62
Recognizing that there are occasions when the doctrine of public
policy should be invoked to protect the interest of citizens within a
state, the writer believes that the proper body for the determination
of public policy is the legislature rather than the court. 68 The courts
doctrine that chattel mortgages are not favored in Pennsylvania is not only recognized
in the decisions of the courts . . • but is inferentially recognized by the fact that,
under certain circumstances, chattel mortgages have been authorized by acts of assembly
to cover special classes of personal property." Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Casey, (C. C. A. 3d,
1932) 61 F. (2d) 473 at 474. Only in a few special cases has the legislature seen fit
to permit mortgages on personal property. Automobiles, household furniture, washing
machines, mechanical refrigerators, radios and the like are not among the articles permitted to be sold under chattel mortgages.
58
See note 53, supra.
59
3 JoNEs, CHA'ITEL MORTGAGES AND CoNDITIONAL SALES, 6th ed., § 1012
(1933). A statement in McCormick v. First National Bank of Mead, 88 Colo. 599
at 603, 299 P. 7 (1931), that "A mortgage of chattels under our statute is a conditional sale" cannot be understood. The court cites no statute. A diligent search of the
Colorado statutes reveals no provision for conditional sales, except in connection with
railroad equipment. Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935), c. 139, § 92. On the other hand chattel
mortgages are expressly provided for and regulated. Id., c. 3 2.
60
•
See note 52, supra.
61
Morelock v. Morgan·& Bird Gravel Co., 174 La. 658, 141 So. 368 (1931);
McDaniel v. Lieberman, (La. App. 1934) 157 So. 834; 3 JoNEs, CHATTEL MoRTGAGES AND CoNDITIONAU SALES, 6th ed., § u57 (1933).
2
<1 3 JoNES, CHATTEL MORTGAGES. AND CONDITIONAL SALES, 6th ed., § u57
(1933). Chattel mortgages were at one time unknown to the law of Louisiana. But
now practically any kind of movable property may be mortgaged. I id., § 207. BEALE,
CoNFLicT OF LAws, § 266.3 (1935), is, therefore, in error when he says: "In
Pennsylvania and Louisiana, a chattel mortgage is not only not allowed but is so
strongly against the policy of the states that a foreign chattel mortgage created in
another state will be given absolutely no effect." IO TULANE L. REV. 275 (1936)
points out the error of Beale and cites Harnischfeger Sale Corp. v. Sternberg Co., 179
La. 317, 154 So. IO (1934), to the effect that chattel mortgages of other states will
now be recognized in Louisiana.
68 "Whether recognition of a right acquired abroad shonld be granted or withheld
is essentially a political question dependent on factors which cannot be accurately ascertained by the use of judicial machinery. To allow the courts to decide it is to open
the. door to variable individual conceptions of policy on the one hand and a blind
adherence to precedence on the other, as may be abundantly demonstrated.••• The
feeling, frequently articulate, that the court is a tool ill adapted to such determination
is not to be denied. Strong as this belief may be when local transactions are concerned,
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.should never deprive one of a vested property right acquired in a foreign state in the absence of a positive statute existing in the_ forum. It
is hoped that the courts of Colorado, Pennsylvania, and Texas will,
without recourse to statutes, cease to impose their ideas of policy and
morality on a transaction. Goodrich says: 64
"As among our states, the sight of the courts of one state
refusing to appl}1i the law of another because the second state's
rule shocks the morals of the forum, is one to make the judicious
·grieve. Judge Beach called it 'an intolerable affectation of superior
virtue,' and it is hard to improve on his phrase. A mutual tolerance for each other's little idiosyncracies does riot seem a great
deal to ask from members of a family of states which have so
much in common as we have. Such mutual tolerance is all that is
necessary in order to get rid of the public policy argument altogether in Conflict of Laws among the states of this country." 05

B. What Constitutes a Removal
It frequently becomes necessary to determip.e when property has
been legally "removed" from one state to another, so as to bring it
within the common law and statutes of the particular state. The question was clearly and definitely settled in Hare & Chase v. Tomkinson, 66
a New Jersey case, construing the "removal" provisions of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act. A truck was sold in Philadelphia to Tomkinson under a bailment lease agreement, which was not required to
be recorded in Pennsylvania. Tomkinscm maintained a residence at
Hammonton, New Jersey, but the truck was kept at his place of business in Philadelphia. The truck was used in his business of transporting
it must become even more persuasive when the scope of the doctrine affects interstate
and foreign business." Nutting, "Suggested Limitations on the Public Policy Doctrine,"
19 MINN. L. REV. 196 at 202, 203 (1934).
"Some of the courts, speaking on this subject, have said that the immediate
representatives of the people in legislature assembled would seem to be the fairest
exponents of what public policy requires, as being most familiar with the habits and
fashions of the day, and with the actual condition of commerce and trade, their consequent wants and weaknesses; that legislation is least objectionable, because it undertakes prospectively, as a guide in future negotiations, and does not, like a judgment of
a court, annul a contract already concluded." McNamara v. Gargett, 68 Mich. 454 at
460-461, 36 N. W. 218 (1888).
64
Goodrich, "Foreign Facts and Local Fancies," 25 VA. L. REv. 26 at 35
(1938).
65
Substantially the same view may be found expressed in Asher, "Public Policy
in the Law of Conflicts in Pennsylvania," 13 TEMP. L. Q. 216 at 225 (1939);
Cavers, "A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem," 44 HARV. L. REv. 173 at 201
(1933); 30 MICH. L. REV. 458 (1932).
66
129 A. 396 (N. J. S. Ct. 1925).
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goods between Philadelphia and Atlantic City. Har:e & Chase, judg- ment creditor of Tomkinson, had the truck levied upon while it was
being used on one of the trips between Philadelphia and Atlantic City.
The creditor contended that the situs of the truck was in Hammonton
and that the seller had failed to file the agreement within ten days
after acquiring knowledge of removal, as required by the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act; and that the agreement was void so far as
creditors of Tomkinson were concerned. The court said:
" ... The word 'removal' in the New Jersey statute does not
mean a mere bringing of the truck within the territorial limits of
New Jersey. . . . It seems to me that by fixing the situs of the
truck in Pennsylvania, as was done by the agreement; a removal
to New Jersey, within the meaning of the statute, could only be
accomplished by the buyer forming, first, an intent in his mind
to remove the truck to New Jersey; and, secondly, actually removing the truck to some place in New Jersey which the buyer
fixes as the. New Jersey situs of the truck. It is like a charige of
domicile.· ... The mere fact that it was used in New Jersey in the
manner it was, or bore a New Jersey license tag was no evidence
of a removal within the meaning of the statute as· above defined.
It was necessary for the judgment creditor to prove the change
of situs." 67
The view expressed in Hare & Chase v. Tomkinson has generally
been accepted.68 Thus, jewelry and automobiles brought into a state
on short business or pleasure trips have not. been legally "removed."
Id. at 397, 398.
,
C. I. T. Corp. v. Coleman, 54 Ga. App. 576, 188 S. E. 585 (1936); Endler
v. Commercial Credit Corp., 105 N. J. L. 474, 144 A. 582 (1929); General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Schwartz, II8 N. J. L. 25, 190 A. 625 (1937), affirmed II8
N. J. L. 563, 194 A. 183 (1937); Forgan v. Smedal, 20 Wis. 564, 234 N. W. 896
(1931); C. I. T. Corp. v. Guy, 170 Va. 16, 195.S. E. 659 (1938); 17 N. C. L.
REV. 56 at 61 (1938).
In C. I. T. Corp. v. Guy, supra, an automobile was sold in South Carolina
under a duly recorded conditional sale contract. A third person was injured by the
conditional buyer, while driving through Virginia en route to Baltimore. A judgment
was rendered against the conditional buyer in a Virginia court, and the sale of the
automobile was ordered in satisfaction thereof. The plaintiff finance company, assignor
of the conditional seller, intervened and claimed by reason -0f the conditional sale
contract a prior lien on the proceeds from the sale of the automobile. The court
sustained the contention of the plaintiff, holding that the automobile had not been
"removed" to Virginia within the Virginia statute requiring a recordation of valid
foreign chattel mortgages on property removed from other states. The word "removed"
was construed as implying no~ only a taking of the property into Virginia, but also the
allowing of it to come to rest therein so as to gain a situs.
61
68
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C. Problems of Pennsylvania Bailment Leases
Having considered the general rules of conflict of laws governing
chattel mortgages and conditional sales, we now pass to a consideration of problems peculiar to the Pennsylvania bailment lease. The socalled Pennsylvania bailment lease is a bailment with an option to buy
attached. The parties to the transaction are called bailor and bailee, or
lessor and lessee. The money payable from time to time is called
"rental" or some other word consistent with the idea of a bailment.
Whenever the lessee has paid his last installment of rental, he is given
the option of buying the chattel for a dollar or some other nominal
sum. Until the option is exercised, the lessor ( the seller) has the legal
title and the lessee ( the buyer) has merely the possession. Bailment
leases, although unrecorded and unfiled, are valid in Pennsylvania
against all persons. 60 In other states bailment leases and transactions of
similar nature are construed as conditional sales. 70 In about threefourths of the states conditional sale contracts, in order to be valid
against innocent third persons, are by statute required to be recorded. 71
In all states a chattel mortgage, conditional sale, and bailment lease
will be recognized as valid between the parties without a recordation.
Therefore, the real question in this c'on:flict of laws field is: What is
the status of an unrecorded bailment lease in a state where such instruments are required to be recorded?
Problems with varied fact situations present themselves for solution. The law of what state will be applied to an unrecorded bailment
lease executed in Pennsylvania upon property located at the time of
its execution in another state? An unrecorded bailment lease executed
in another state upon property located at the time of its execution in
Pennsylvania? An unrecorded bailment lease executed in another state,
upon property located in that state, but which is subsequently brought
into Pennsylvania? And lastly, and by far the most important, what
69

Stern & Co. v. Paul, 96 Pa. Super. !12 (1928); General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Hartman, !14 Pa. Super. 795, 174 A. 795 (1934). There exists no statute
providing for either the recording or filing of bailment lease contracts, so that a
compliance with the conditional sales or chattel mortgages filing statutes becomes a
mere gratuitous act.
70
ESTRicH, INSTALLMENT SALES, 89 (1926); 3 JoNEs, CHATTEL MoRTGAGEs
AND CONDITIONAL SALEs,6th ed., 960 (1933); 1 WILLISTON, SALES, 2d ed., § 336
(1924).
In Texas all title-retaining instruments are designated, by statute, chattel mortgages. Tex. Stat. (Vernon, 1936), art. 5489.
71
Hanna, "The Extension of Public Recordation," 31 CoL. L. REv. 617 at 638
(1931).
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law will govern an unrecorded bailment lease executed in Pennsylvania upon property located therein at the time, but which is subsequently removed into another state?
In all the above fact situations a. further question might be asked:
Who are the parties to the litigation? Is it a contract problem involving
the rights and obligations of the original parties, or is it a title problem
involving claims of creditors of, or bona fide purchasers from, the
person in possession? If the controversy is between the bailor and
bailee, -as to their rights and obligations under the terms of the agreement, the question in all the above factual situations is one of contract
and should be determined by the lex loci contractus. There are, of
course, some few jurisdictions that will apply the law of the place of
performance or the law of the place intended by the parties, if either
of these places is di:ff erent from the place where the contract is made.
But the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, leading text writers, and
most jurisdictions apply the law of the state where the contract is
made. 72 Procedural matters are in all cases determined by the law of
the place where the action is brought.73 If the controversy is between
the bailor and creditors of, or bona fide purchasers from, the bailee, the
case involves a title problem and must be determined in accordance
with the foregoing rules.
If an unrecorded bailment lease is executed in Pennsylvania upon
a chattel located at the time of its execution in X State, the law of X
State governs the transaction.74 This is an application of the law of
situs, and is the rule followed in Green v. Van Buskirk. The lex situs
is generally applied today to all cases involving a creation or transfer
of interests to movable chattels.75 Therefore, if X State has a recording
statute applicable to conditional sales, the bailment lease executed in
Pennsylvania will not protect the interests of the ·bailor in X State
against creditors of, and bona-fide purchasers from, the bailee if there
has not been a compliance with the recording statutes of X State. If
there is no recording statute for conditional sales in X State, then the
bailor will be protected; and it matters little whether X State applies
its own laws of conditional sales or Pennsylvania's laws of bailment
leases.
If an unrecorded bailment lease is executed in X State upon a
chattel located at the time of its execution in Pennsylvania, the law of
72

See note 3, supra,

78

GooDRICH, CoNFLICT OF

74

See note 14, supra.
75 See note 4, supra.

LA.ws, 2d ed., § 77 (1938).
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Pennsylvania governs the transaction. This is the converse of the preceding rule. The bailor's interest will be protected in Pennsylvania
against the claims of creditors of, or bona fide purchasers from, the
bailee. There need not be a compliance with any recording statutes
that may exist in X State.. The recording statutes of X State have no
application to security transactions on property located in other states.
If there is no conditional sales recording statute in X State and an
unrecorded bailment lease is executed in X State upon a chattel located
therein, and the chattel is subsequently removed to Pennsylvania, the
interest of the bailor will be protected against creditors of, or bona fide
purchasers from, the bailee.76 It is immaterial whether the chattel was
removed with or without the consent of the bailor. The transaction
presents little difficulty as Pennsylvania can apply either its own domestic laws of bailment leases or its conflict of laws principles regarding
transactions taking place in X State. In both cases the bailnr's interest
will be protected. The correct principle to apply, of course, would be
the conflict of laws doctrine applicable to foreign-executed conditional
sales.
'
If X State has a conditional sales recording statute and the bailment lease has not been recorded thereunder, and the chattel is subsequently removed to Pennsylvania, in accordance with general rules
applicable to chattel mortgages and conditional sales, the bailor's interest should not be protected in Pennsylvania against the claims of
creditors of, or bona fide purchasers from, the bailee. If a titleretaining instrument is invalid in the state where the chattel is situated
at the time the agreement is executed, it is said to be invalid in any
state into which the chattel is subsequently removed.11 This rule is
applicable, according to the Restatement, although the circumstances
are such that the instrument would have been valid had the chattel
76
This statement is based upon the assumption that the transaction will be recognized by the Pennsylvania courts as a true bailment lease. If the Pennsylvania courts
should designate the transaction a conditional sale, then it would have to be filed in
Pennsylvania within ten days after the seller has received notice of the county to which
the property has been removed. Uniform Conditional Sales Act, § 14, Act of May 12,
1925, P. L. 603, Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1931), tit. 69, § 432. It is immaterial that
the state in which the conditional sale was executed did not require a recordation or
filing. The Pennsylvania statute is for the protection of creditors of, or bona fide
purchasers from, conditional buyers in possession of conditionally sold property in
Pennsylvania. It seems advisable, therefore, when there is the slightest doubt as to the
nature of the transaction, to file the agreement as a conditional sale. If it turns out
that the transaction is a conditional sale, valuable rights have been safeguarded; while
if it is held to be a bailment lease, nothing is lost but the payment of trivial filing fees.
11 See note 16, supra.
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been in the second state at the time when the attempt was made to
mortgage or conditionally sell it:18 A contrary holding would permit
the bailor to claim in the state to which the chattel had been removed
a greater right than he had under the law of the state where the chattel
was at the time the bailment was executed. Nevertheless, Goodrich and
cases from two jurisdictions have said substantially this.79 Goodrich's
argument is to the effect that the recording statute of X State does not
affect the validity of the agreement itself but is created only for the
purpose of protecting creditors and innocent purchasers within X State,
and that the conditional seller should not be prevented from claiming
against creditors and purchasers in a state to which the chattel has been
removed. 80
If an unrecorded bailment lease is executed in Pennsylvania upon
a chattel located therein at the time, and the chattel is subsequently
removed to X State without the consent of the bailor, the bailor's interest should be protected in X State against the creditors of, or purchasers from, the bailee,81 at least, in the absence of a settled public
CONFLICTS RESTATEMENT, § 267 (1934).
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Northwest Engineering Co., 146
Miss. 476, ,II2 So. 580 (1927); Marvin Safe Co. v. Norton, 48 N. J. L. 410, 7 A.
418 (1886); GooDRICH, CoNFLICT oF LAws, 2d ed., § 153, note n3 (1938).
In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Northwest Engineering Co., supra,
property was sold under a conditional sale contract in Wisconsin for immediate shipment to Mississippi. Wisconsin law required such contracts to be recorded in order
to be valid against attaching creditors without notice. Under Mississippi law a recording
was not required. Creditors, without notice of the buyer in Mississippi, attached. Held,
that law of situs governed and seller's title not divested by failure to record.
In Marvin Safe Co. v. Norton, supra, ~ safe was sold in Pennsylvania at a time
when Pennsylvania conditional sales were void as to creditors of conditional buyer and
innocent purchasers claiming through him. Safe was delivered by seller to carrier in
Pennsylvania, to be shipped to New Jersey, when it was sold by conditional buyer to
an innocent purchaser. Conditional sales were valid at the time in New Jersey without
recordation. Innocent purchaser contended that power given conditional buyer by
Pennsylvania law to defeat the interest of the conditional seller followed the chattel
to New Jersey. New Jersey court held in favor of conditional seller. The court said:
"The public policy which has given rise to the doctrine of the Pennsylvania courts is
local, and the law which gives effect is also local, and has no extra-territorial effect.
In the· case in hand, the safe was removed to this state by Schwartz [ conditional buyer]
as soon as he became the purchaser." 48 N. J. L. at 418.
In both the above cases the courts could have reached the same result by holding
that the chattel was removed with the consent of the conditional seller and ther~by
had become subject to the laws of the second state. Or, again, the courts could have
found factually that the chattels were delivered to :the second state by the seller and
that for this reason the law of the second state was applicable.
80
GooDRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS, 2d ed., § 153, note II3 (1938).
81
See note l 8, supra.
In Motors Mortgage Corp. v. Purchase-Money Note Co., -:i8 Go.. App. 222, 143
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policy or positive statute in X State. Only Texas and Colorado refuse,
on grounds of a nonstatutory public policy, to recognize foreignexecuted conditional sales on property brought into the state. 82 In states
that have enacted positive statutes, like the Uniform Conditional Sales
Act, applying specifically to property brought into the state under a
foreign-executed chattel mortgage or conditional sale, the Pennsylvania bailment lease must unquestionably be recorded. 88 If the statute
applicable to chattel mortgages should be different in any way from
the statute applicable to conditional sales, the latter statute should be
complied with, as bailment leases, in jurisdictions other than Pennsylvania, are invariably classified as conditional sales and not as chattel
mortgages. Section r of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, as adopted
in states other than Pennsylvania, expressly included a bailment lease
within its definition of a conditional sale. Therefore, if a chattel sold
in Pennsylvania under a bailment lease contract is taken across the
state boundary for a permanent situs in New York, New Jersey, Delaware, or West Virginia, it has to be filed as a conditional sale within
ten days after the bailor has received notice of the county to which the
property has been removed. 84 All of these states, bordering Pennsylvania, have enacted the Uniform Conditional Sales Act.85
Although in a small minority of the states if a bailor's interest
under a Pennsylvania bailment lease might be protected, even when
S. E. 459 (1928), property sold in Pennsylvania under a bailment lease contract was
removed to Georgia and sold by the lessee to an innocent purchaser without notice.
The report does not state whether or not the removal was with the consent of the
bailor. The court implied that the law of Pennsylvania would have governed had it
been pleaded or proved, but that since it was not, it was presumed that the common
law of Georgia was in force there. Under the laws of Georgia the bailment lease was
construed a conditional sale and void- as to innocent purchasers without notice.
The above decision is sound. As between common-law jurisdictions, the common
law of one may reasonably be presumed to be what it is decided to be in the other,
in a case tried in the latter state. The burden of proving that the law of Pennsylvania
was different from the law of Georgia was upon the lessor. See Cuba Railroad Company
v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473 at 479, 32 S. Ct. 132 (1912); Kales, "Presumption of the
Foreign Law," 19 HARV. L. REv. 401 (1906).
82
See notes 52 and, 54, supra. A bailment lease executed in Pennsylvania probably can be validated in Texas by complying with the Texas chattel mortgage
recording statutes. Bailment leases and conditional sales are by statute designated
chattel mortgages in Texas. See note 54, supra. But a Pennsylvania bailment lease, on
the other hand, can in no way be validated in Colorado, as both domestic and foreign
executed conditional sales are in Colorado void as to innocent third persons. See note
52, supra.
88
Hare & Chase v. Tomkinson, 129 A. 396 (N. J. S. Ct. 1925).
84
Uniform Conditional Sales Act, § 14. Also see note
supra.
85
2 UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED (Supp. 1941), p. 6.
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the chattel is removed into the state with the consent of the bailor,86 in
what is the greater number of the states, the bailor's interest will be
forfeited to creditors of, or bona fide purchasers from, the bailee if the
chattel is removed into the state with the consent of the bailor and steps
are not taken to comply with the recording statutes. 87 In states that
have enacted the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, the bailor need take
no steps to protect his interest until ten days after he has received
notice of the county to which the property has been removed.88

D. Express Stipulations that Law of Particular State Shall Govern
One final conflict of laws problem remains to be considered. What
effect will the courts give to an express stipulation that the laws of a
particular state are intended by the parties to control the transaction?
There is, as on most conflict of laws questions, a considerable difference
of opinion. 80 Most courts, however, will enforce the express stipulation
only where the parties have limited their choice of law to either the
place of making or the place of performing the contract.90 An unqualified permission on the part of the parties to determine for themselves
~e law to govern a particular transaction, it is argued, would in effect
make of the parties a legislative- body. The parties to the agreement
would be able to dispense with the legal rules of a state by a mere
stipulation among themselves.
The general rule is enunciated in a comparatively recent case.91
Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows Co., a circus company with winter quarters
in Indiana and with permanent headquarters at Chicago, Illinois, executed a written contract in Indiana with a performer for personal
services to be rendered in various parts of the United States. The
86

See note 30, supra.
See note 33, supra.
88
See note 84, supra.
89
2 BEALE, CoNFLICT OF LAws, § 332.2 (1935); GooDRicH, CoNFLICT oF
LAws, 2d ed., §§ 107, 108 (1938); 3 JoNES, CIIATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES, 6th ed., § 1154 (1933); 20 MINN. L. REv. 309 (1935); 112
A. L. R. 124 (1938).
90
E. Gerli & Co., v. Cunard S.S. Co., (C. C. A. 2d, 1931) 48 F. (2d) 115;
Brierley v. Commercial Credit Co., (C. C. A. 3rd, 1931) 43 F. (2d) 730; Bundy v.
Commercial Credit Co., 200 N. C. 511, 157 S. E. 860 (1931); Owens v. Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows Co., 58 R. I. 162, 192 A. 158 (1937); 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF
LAws, §.332.2 (1935); GooDRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws, 2d ed.,§§ 107-108 (1938);
Parker, "Free Will in Conflict of Laws," 6 TULANE L. REV. 454 at 456 (1932); 20
MINN. L. REV. 309 (1935); 112 A. L. R. 124 (1938).
Some few courts are inclined to extend the choice of law to any state that some
important element of the contract has a real relation thereto. Id.
91
Owens v. Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows Co., 58 R. I. 162, 192 A. 158 (1937).
87
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written agreement, however, specified that the contract was made in
Sarasota County, Florida, and "That in said county and State of
Florida shall all matters whether sounding in contract or in tort relating to the validity, construction, interpretation and enforcement of
this contract, be determined." A breach of the contract occurred and a
suit was commenced in Rhode Island. The circus company contended
that the contract should be construed in accordance with the law of
Florida. The Rhode Island court held that the contract should be
construed in accordance with the law of Indiana, the plaee where the
contract was actually made. The court said that the jurisdiction whose
law is stipulated to govern must have an essential relation to the transaction in question, and pointed out that the choice of jurisdiction is
usually limited to the place of performing the contract.
Another case is Stoddard v. Thomas. 92 A building and loan association incorporated under the laws of V'irginia, but construed by the court
to be domicil~d and transacting all its business in the District of Columbia, took a mortgage from one of its members to secure a loan.
The loan was executed and made payable in the District of Columbia,
but the contract stipulated that it should be governed by the laws of
Virginia. Under the laws of Virginia the rate of interest was valid,
while under the laws of the District of Columbia the rate was usurious.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court held the rate usurious in accordance
with the laws of the District of Columbia, saying:
" ... No one questions the right of a corporation, such as an
insurance company for example, to provide that its policies
although issued to a person in another state shall be governed by
the laws of the state of its residence. On the other hand, the mere
designation by the parties that the laws of some other state shall
govern when neither the place of the making of the contract nor
the place of its performance is in such designated state is not sufficient to bring such contract under the laws of such state when the
evident purpose is to escape the effect of the statutes of the st~te
in which the parties are when the contract is made. If this were
not so, the usury laws and many others which might be mentioned
would be of no effect, and could be evaded with impunity." 98
There are few actual cases involving stipulations .in bailment leases
and other title-retaining instruments to the effect that the laws of a
92
98

60 Pa. Super. 177 (1915).
Id. at 181.
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given state shall govern the transaction. 94 ,This is surprising, indeed,
when it is considered that most title-retaining instruments usually contain such provisions. Nevertheless, in the light of the above general
rules, one might be perfectly safe in saying that it is impossible for
persons living in X State to make a bailment lease contract on property
located in that state but which will be governed by the laws of Pennsylvania.115 It is what Judge Learned Hand has described as an effort
' "to pull on one's bootstraps." 96
A bailment lease governed by the laws of Pennsylvania is so much
superior, so far as the bailor is concerned, to a conditional sale or other
title-retaining instrument governed by the laws of other states, that
ind,eed rare would be the case of a bailment executed in Pennsylvania
stipulating that the laws of some other state should govern.
If the installment buyer should be in the position to dictate the
terms of the agreement, and he were seeking one favorable to himself,
he would reject the bailment lease altogether and use in its place the
conditional sale.
· The typical situation would seem to apply when the bailment lease
is executed in Pennsylvania and· the bailed property is removed to another state before completion of the terms of the agreement. Let us
suppose that the contract expressly stipulated that the laws of Pennsylvania shall govern the transaction. If the controversy is between
the bailor and some creditor of, or purchaser from, the bailee, then
there is a question of ownership of property involved and the lex situs
will govern. It is not likely that the courts of the state into which the
property has been removed will consent to the bailor and bailee regulating the rights of innocent third persons. But if, on the other hand,
the controversy is between the bailor and bailee as to their reciprocal
rights and obligations under the contract, then there is a contract ques114 Stern v. Drew, (App. D. C. 1922) 285 F. 925; H. G. Craig

& Co. v. Uncas
Paperboard Co., 104 Conn. 559, 133 A. 673 (1926).
95 In Stern v. Drew, (App. D. C. 1922) 285 F. 925, a bailment lease agreement
provided: "It is agreed that !his lease .•. "shall be construed as made in the state of
Pennsylvani~ and subject to the laws of Pennsylvania. This agreement of lease shall be
governed by the laws of Pennsylvania," but the facts are not sufficiently reported to
determine where the contract was executed. Presumably. the agreement was executed
in the District of Columbia, where the chattel continuously remained. In a controversy
between the bailor and a purchaser from the "bailee, the court held the contract a conditional sale, and, since it was unrecorded, void as to the innocent purchaser.
116 E. Gerli & Co., v. Cunard S. S. Co., (C. C. A. 2d, 1931) 48 F. (2d)
II5 at II7.
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tion involved and the lex loci contractus will govern. In fact, in the
latter case, the lex loci contract'us will usually be applied in the absence
of a stipulation in the contract. This is the rule adhered to in the great
majority of states and carries the weight of the Restatement and text
authorities. 97 If, by chance, the state into which the property has been
removed adheres to the doctrine of applying the law of the place intended by the parties, then there is every reason to believe that the
courts will follow the express stipulation of the parties and apply the
law of Pennsylvania_. 98 Logically, this is the only instance where an
express stipulation that a particular law is intended to control the transaction should be given any weight.
In H. G. Craig 61 Co. v. Uncas Paperboard Co.,99 a Connecticut
case, machinery was sold in Pennsylvania under a bailment lease agreement, with the understanding that the machines were to be used in a
Connecticut factory. The agreement contained a clause saying "that
this contract is made in the State of Pennsylvania and shall be executed
in accordance with the laws of said state." The lessor contended that,
as a consequence of the provision, the Pennsylvania law should govern
the transaction. Under the laws of Connecticut the transaction was a
conditional sale and void, without recordation, as against creditors and
bona fide purchasers. In a controversy between the lessor and a receiver, acting as a representative of the creditor, the law of Connecticut
was held to govern. The decision was properly rendered, as here the
controversy involved a property question and the law of situs was the
correct principle to apply. If it had been a controversy between the
lessor and lessee as to their respective rights, then the Iaw of Pennsylvania should have governed, as the case would have involved a
contract question. The Connecticut court, however, in construing the
provision in the bailment lease to the effect that the Pennsylvania law
should govern, said that the word "made" could not be construed to
mean "govern." This attempt to interpret the agreement was unnecessary.
If the bailment is executed in Pennsylvania and it is the duty of the
bailor to deliver the chattel to the bailee in another state, although
questions involving property rights arising out of controversies with
creditors of, or purchasers from, the bailee in the second state are
97

CONFLICTS RESTATEMENT, § 332 (1934); 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS, §
332.57 (1935); GooDRICH, CoNFLICT OF LAws, 2d ed., § 107 (1938).
98
Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U. S. 124, I S. Ct. 102 (1882).
99
104 Conn. 559, 133 A. 673 (1926).
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admittedly governed by the law ofsitus,100 there seems no objection to
the bailor and bailee stipulating that their own ~espective rights shall
be governed by the law of Pennsylvania. The actual meeting of the
minds occurred in Pennsylvania and it can be said that this is the state
in which the contract is made 101 so far as rights affecting the parties
themselves are concerned. Pennsylvania ca,nnot be placed in the category of some state arbitrarily selected by the parties that has no real
connection with the agreement of the parties. Pennsylvania has a bona
fide, not a fictitious, connection with the subject matter of the trans- ·
action.102
100

,

Hervey v. Rhode Island Locomotive Works, 93 U. S. 664 (1876); Davis v.
Crompton, (C. C. A. 3d, 1907) 158 F.- 735; H. G. Craig & Co. v. Uncas Paperboard
Co., 104 Conn. 559, 133 A. 673 (1926); Johnson v. Sauerman Bros., 243 Ky. 587,
49 S. W. (2d) 331 (1932); Knowles Loom Works v. Vacher, 57 N. J. L. 490, 31 A.
306 (1895), affirmed in 59 N. J. L. 586, 39 A. 1II4 (1896); Ford Motor Co. v.
National Bond & Investment Co., 294 Ill. App. 585, 14 N. E. (2d) 306 (1938); Eli
Bridge Co. v. Lachman, 124 Ore. 592, 265 P. 435 (1928); 3 JoNES, CHATrEL
MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES, 6th ed., § I I 50 ( I 93 3) ; STOMBERG, CoNFLICT OF LAws, 369 (1937); l WILLISTON, SALES, 2d ed., § 339 (1924); Uniform
Conditional Sales Act, § 14; BoGERT, CoMMENTARIES ON CONDITIONAL SALES, 2A
UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED, § 96 (1924); 87 A. L. R. 1308 (1933).
101
A contract is usually said to have been made in the state where the last act
necessary to make it a binding agreement takes place. GooDRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS,
2d ed., § 104 (1938). In a bailment lease, if the parties are dealing face to face, the
parties become definitely bound to _each other when the agreement is signed. Would
the bailor not be liable for a breach of contract if he failed to deliver the chattel to
the bailee?
102
Owens v. Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows Co., 58 R. I. 162, 192 A. 158 (1937).

